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ABSTRACT
Widespread deployment of the Internet enabled building of
an emerging IT delivery model, i.e., cloud computing. Al-
beit cloud computing-based services have rapidly developed,
their security aspects are still at the initial stage of develop-
ment. In order to preserve cybersecurity in cloud computing,
cybersecurity information that will be exchanged within it
needs to be identified and discussed. For this purpose, we
propose an ontological approach to cybersecurity in cloud
computing. We build an ontology for cybersecurity opera-
tional information based on actual cybersecurity operations
mainly focused on non-cloud computing. In order to discuss
necessary cybersecurity information in cloud computing, we
apply the ontology to cloud computing. Through the discus-
sion, we identify essential changes in cloud computing such
as data-asset decoupling and clarify the cybersecurity infor-
mation required by the changes such as data provenance and
resource dependency information.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—
Security and Protection; H.1.m [Information System]: Mod-
els and Principles—Miscellaneous; K.6.5 [Management of
Computing and Information Systems]: Security and
Protection
General Terms
Security, Design, Theory
Keywords
cybersecurity, cloud computing, ontology, information ex-
change
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1. INTRODUCTION
Information technology is rapidly evolving. Widespread
deployment of the Internet enabled construction of an emerg-
ing IT delivery model, i.e., cloud computing. Albeit there
exist various definitions of cloud computing, one of the com-
monly recognized definition is provided by the National In-
stitute of Standards and Technology (NIST): Cloud com-
puting is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand net-
work access to a shared pool of configurable computing re-
sources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and
services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with
minimal management effort or service provider interaction
[15]. Cloud computing is massively scalable, provides a supe-
rior user experience, and is characterized by new, Internet-
driven economics.
Following the emergence of cloud computing, services over
cloud computing, i.e., cloud services, have been rapidly de-
veloped. Cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services and
Google Apps, are accessible via a web browser or web service
application programming interface (API) and are regarded
as convenient and cost-saving. The market size of cloud
services, in terms of spending, is therefore growing rapidly;
with the USD 17 billion in 2009 expected to burgeon into
USD 44 billion in 2013 [11]. In terms of the percentage of
the total IT market size, IT cloud services are expected to
grow from 5% in 2009 to 10% in 2013 [11], which means they
will outpace traditional IT spending over the coming years.
Cloud services are, however, provided by individual cloud
service operators and have very little interoperability. In or-
der to build and secure the interoperability, it is necessary
to build international standards, which improve application
portability enabling resource accommodation between cloud
service providers. With these advancements, reliability in
times of disaster can be drastically improved. Major organi-
zations such as Open Grid Forum (OGF), Distributed Man-
agement Task Force (DMTF) and Storage Network Industry
Association (SNIA) are currently focusing on the service in-
teroperability issues [9, 22, 33]. Regarding security issues,
albeit their importance is advocated and some security guid-
ances are provided by the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) [2],
technical standard-building in cloud computing is still in its
initial stages of development.
Preserving cybersecurity in cloud computing requires iden-
tifying what kind of cybersecurity information needs to be
exchanged. For this purpose, we propose an ontological ap-
proach. We build an ontology for cybersecurity operational
information based on actual cybersecurity operations mainly
focused on non-cloud computing. In order to discuss neces-
sary cybersecurity information in cloud computing, we ap-
ply the ontology to cloud computing. The ontology shows a
holistic perspective of cybersecurity operations and provides
the categories of cybersecurity operational information. For
each of these, we discuss cybersecurity information that is
newly required or that needs modifying to suit a cloud com-
puting context. For instance, we discuss what type of in-
cident log will be required for incident handling operations
in cloud computing, and what type of asset description in-
formation will be required for managing IT assets for each
user organization in cloud computing. Through this discus-
sion, we identify essential changes in cloud computing such
as data-asset decoupling and clarify the cybersecurity infor-
mation necessitated by changes such as data provenance and
resource dependency information.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2
presents related works, section 3 describes our proposed on-
tology, section 4 discusses cybersecurity in cloud computing,
section 5 summarizes essential changes in cloud computing
extracted from the discussion and section 6 concludes this
paper.
2. RELATED WORKS
In order to build an ontology for cybersecurity operational
information, it is beneficial to understand the need for an
ontology and some security ontology works.
An ontology is an explicit specification of a conceptual-
ization, which is an abstract, simplified view of the world
that we wish to represent for certain purposes [12]. Ontolo-
gies are useful as means to support sharing and reutilization
of knowledge [7]. This reusability approach is based on the
assumption that if a modeling scheme, i.e., an ontology, is
explicitly specified and mutually agreed upon by the parties
involved, then it is possible to share, reutilize and extend
knowledge [34].
Fenz et al. proposed a security ontology [10] with concepts
grouped into three subontologies: security, enterprise, and
location. The security subontology introduces five concepts:
attribute, threat, rating, control and vulnerability. Wang
et al, introduced an ontology for security vulnerabilities [36,
37], which focuses on software vulnerabilities and discussed
the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [19]. Tsoumas
et al. extended the DMTF Common Information Model
(CIM) standard with ontological semantics in order to uti-
lize it as a container for IS security-related information, and
proposed an ontology of security operation for an arbitrary
information system and defined it in OWL [34, 35]. Parkin
et al. proposed an information security ontology incorporat-
ing human-behavioral implications [21]. This ontology pro-
vides a framework for investigating the casual relationships
of human-behavioral implications resulting from information
security management decisions, before security controls are
deployed. Denker et al. proposed several ontologies for se-
curity annotations of agents and web services using OWL
[8]. They mainly addressed knowledge representation and
some of the reasoning issues for trust and security in the
Semantic Web. Albeit there exist various other ontology
works, the reusability of their ontologies is rather limited or
they are still at early stages of development, as Blanco et al.
discussed in a survey of security ontologies [4].
Different from the aforementioned works, our viewpoint is
on actual cybersecurity operations, and we focus on build-
ing an ontology of cybersecurity operational information.
For practicality and reusability, we build the ontology based
on intensive discussions with cybersecurity operators. The
ontology can provide a framework for sharing and reutiliz-
ing cybersecurity operational information and can define the
terminology. Our initial work is found in [23].
3. ONTOLOGY OF CYBERSECURITY OP-
ERATIONAL INFORMATION
Based on intensive discussions with major cybersecurity
operators, we build an ontology of cybersecurity operational
information. The discussions covered actual cybersecurity
operations in the USA, Japan, and Korea. Albeit each cy-
bersecurity operator runs slightly different operations, we
succeeded in building a generalized ontology of cybersecu-
rity operational information. First, we define the domains
for cybersecurity operations in section 3.1, and identify the
entities required to run the operations in the domains in
section 3.2. Based on the domains and entities, we iden-
tify cybersecurity information provided by entities in each
operation domain and build the ontology of cybersecurity
operational information in section 3.3.
3.1 Cybersecurity Operation Domains
The term ”cybersecurity operation” covers a range of se-
curity operations in cyber society. Nevertheless, this paper
focuses on the cybersecurity operations that preserve infor-
mation security in cyber societies. Information security is
the preservation of information confidentiality, integrity, and
availability [20]. Sometimes, it also encompasses account-
ability, authenticity, and reliability of the information [13].
Cybersecurity operations consist of three domains: IT As-
set Management, Incident Handling and Knowledge Accu-
mulation.
The IT Asset Management domain runs cybersecurity op-
erations inside each user organization such as installing, con-
figuring and managing IT assets. The IT asset includes both
resources of users and providers; it includes not only an
user’s own IT assets but also network connectivity, cloud
services and identity services provided by external entities
for the user.
The Incident Handling domain detects and responds to in-
cidents occurring in cyber societies by monitoring computer
events, incidents comprised of several computer events, and
attack behaviors caused by the incidents. More specifically,
it monitors computer events, and when an abnormality is
detected, then it produces an incident report. Based on the
report, it investigates the incident in detail so that it can
clarify the attack pattern and its countermeasures. Based
on the analysis of incidents, it may provide alerts and advi-
sories, e.g. early warnings against potential threats, to user
organizations.
The Knowledge Accumulation domain researches cyber-
security and generates reusable knowledge for other organi-
zations. For reusability by those organizations, it provides
common naming and taxonomy, through which it organizes
and accumulates the knowledge.
3.2 Entities
Based on the cybersecurity operation domains defined in
section 3.1, this section identifies entities necessary for run-
ning cybersecurity operations in each domain. Note that the
entities are defined from the viewpoint of functions; there-
fore one instance of an entity may be an instance of another
entity in the real world.
In the IT Asset Management domain, there exist two en-
tities for its operation: Administrator and IT Infrastruc-
ture Provider. The Administrator administers the system
of its organization, possessing information on its own IT as-
sets. The system administrator inside each organization is
its typical instance. The IT infrastructure Provider provides
each organization with IT infrastructure, which includes the
network connectivity, cloud services such as software as a
service (SaaS), platform as a service (PaaS) and infrastruc-
ture as a service (IaaS), and identity. The Internet Service
Provider (ISP) and Application Service Provider (ASP) are
its typical instances.
In the Incident Handling domain, there exist two entities
for its operation: Response Team and Coordinator. Re-
sponse Team is an entity that monitors and analyzes various
kinds of incidents in cyber-societies, e.g. unauthorized ac-
cess, DDoS attacks and phishing, and accumulates incident
information. Based on the information, it may implement
countermeasures, e.g. registering phishing site addresses on
black lists. The incident response team inside a Managed Se-
curity Service Provider (MSSP) is its typical instance. The
Coordinator is an entity that coordinates with the other en-
tities and addresses potential threats based on known inci-
dents and crime information. The CERT Coordination Cen-
ter (CERT/CC), be it either commercial or non-commercial,
is its typical instance.
In the Knowledge Accumulation domain, there exist three
entities for its operation: Researcher, Product & Service
Provider and Registrar. The Researcher is an entity that re-
searches cybersecurity, extracts knowledge from the research
and accumulates it. Cybersecurity research teams inside
MSSP, e.g. X-force within International Business Machines
Corp. (IBM) as well as the Risk Research Institute of Cyber
Space at the Little eArth Corporation Co., Ltd. (LAC), are
its typical instances. The Product & Service Provider is an
entity that possesses information on products and services,
e.g. naming, versions, their vulnerabilities, their patches
and configuration information. A software house, ASP and
individual private software programmer are its typical in-
stances. The Registrar is an entity that classifies, organizes
and accumulates cybersecurity knowledge provided by the
Researcher and the Product & Service Provider so that the
knowledge can be reutilized by another organization. NIST
and the Information-Technology Promotion Agency, Japan
(IPA) are its typical instances.
3.3 Cybersecurity Information
Based on the aforementioned operation domains and en-
tities, this section identifies cybersecurity operational in-
formation. Considering the information each of the enti-
ties provides, we define four databases and three knowledge
bases, as described in the following subsections.
3.3.1 Incident Database
The Incident Database is a database that contains incident-
related information. The Response Team manipulates such
information. Major items of the information stored in this
database are the event record, incident record and attack
record.
The event record is a record of computer events that in-
cludes information on packets, files and their transactions.
Usually, most of the records are provided by computers au-
tomatically as computer logs; for instance logs such as log-in
time and date as well as terminal information provided when
root users log in to a system. This log is one type of event
record. Common Event Expression (CEE) [28] can be uti-
lized to describe the record.
The incident record is a record of incidents, providing de-
scription of incidents such as computer states and their con-
sequences. This record is derived from analyses of several
event records and their conjectures, which are created auto-
matically and/or manually. For instance, when excessive ac-
cess to one computer is detected, the state of the computer,
i.e., excessive access, as well as its expected consequence, i.e.,
denial of service, should be recorded in an incident record.
Based on this record, the harmfulness of the incident as well
as the need for countermeasures can be judged. Note that an
incident record may record false incidents, i.e., incident can-
didates judged as non-incidents after an investigation. The
Incident Object Description and Exchange Format (IODEF)
[6] can be utilized to describe the record.
The attack record is a record of attacks derived from anal-
yses of incident records. It describes the attack sequence;
such as how the attack was initiated, which IT assets were
targeted, and how the attack’s damage was propagated.
3.3.2 Warning Database
The Warning Database is a database that contains infor-
mation on cybersecurity warnings. The Response Team and
the Coordinator manipulate such information. These warn-
ings are based on the Incident Database and Cyber Risk
Knowledge Base. Based on the warnings, user organizations
may implement countermeasures for warned cybersecurity
risks.
3.3.3 User Resource Database
The User Resource Database is a database that accumu-
lates information on assets inside individual organizations
and contains information such as the list of software/hardware,
their configurations, status of resource usage, security poli-
cies including access control policies, security level assess-
ment result, and intranet topology. The Administrator ma-
nipulates such information.
The Assessment Results Format (ARF) [26] and Common
Result Format (CRF) [3] can be utilized to describe the
IT asset assessment results while the Common Vulnerabil-
ity Scoring System (CVSS) [16]/Common Weakness Scoring
System (CWSS) [30] can be utilized to score the IT asset’s
security level.
This database, as discussed later in section 4.1.1, also con-
tains cloud service subscription information that the individ-
ual user organization is utilizing, such as the list of subscrib-
ing cloud services (e.g., data center and SaaS) and the usage
record of the services.
3.3.4 Provider Resource Database
The Provider Resource Database is a database that ac-
cumulates information on assets outside individual organi-
zations. IT Infrastructure Provider manipulates such infor-
mation. Two main components of the database are external
network information and external cloud service information.
   
	
    
   
 
 ff
fiflffi    !
"#$%&'($() ff
fi
* + 
  !
,-(. /
0%.-(. ff
12%& ff
 *3 	 
4
+
*
	+*
	
      !
"%(. ff
5.6(7#%&(. ff
,ff8,&&'& ff8 .9$:7 '&
;%.<(:
(6.%&(.
.
;%.<(:
(6.%&(.
.
.%7&(=
.%7&(=
.%7&(=
fi	*
 * 
> +
?** !
@*	 * !
@*	 *
A*	*
	+*
&(;#$&
&(;#$&
&(;#$&
%6%
%6%
%6%
%6%
%6%
%6%
%6%
%6%
%6%
@> 4 
B* + *
	+*
4	+*
C 
 
 !
&(;#$&
@> @*D

 
	 
	 
 
 !
&(;#$&
%6%
Figure 1: Proposed ontology of cybersecurity operational information
External network information is on networks with which
each organization is connected with other organizations such
as inter-organization network topology, routing information,
access control policy, traffic status and the security level.
External cloud service information includes the service
specifications, workload information and security policy in-
formation of each cloud service. Note that, user organiza-
tion specific information such as local configuration infor-
mation of each cloud service is stored in the User Resource
Database.
3.3.5 Cyber Risk Knowledge Base
The Cyber Risk Knowledge Base is a knowledge base that
accumulates cybersecurity risk information and includes two
knowledge bases: the Vulnerability Knowledge Base and
Threat Knowledge Base.
The Vulnerability Knowledge Base accumulates known
vulnerability information, which includes naming, taxonomy
and enumeration of known software and system vulnerability
information as well as vulnerabilities caused by their mis-
configuration. It also includes information on human vul-
nerabilities – vulnerabilities exposed by human IT users. In
order to describe the contents of the knowledge base, Com-
mon Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [25] and Common
Weakness Enumeration (CWE) [29] can be utilized.
The Threat Knowledge Base accumulates known cyber-
security threat information including attack knowledge and
mis-use knowledge. Attack knowledge is knowledge of at-
tacks including the information on attack patterns, attack
tools (e.g. malware) and their trends. Trend information
includes past attack trends in terms of geography and at-
tack target, for instance, and statistical information on past
attacks. Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classi-
fication (CAPEC) [24] and Malware Attribute Enumeration
and Characterization (MAEC) [31] can be utilized to de-
scribe the contents of the knowledge base. Mis-use knowl-
edge is on mis-uses caused by users’ inappropriate usage,
which includes both benign and malicious usage. Benign
usage includes mis-typing, mis-recognition caused by inat-
tentional blindness [14], mis-understanding, being caught in
phishing traps. Malicious usage includes compliance viola-
tion such as unauthorized service usage and access to inap-
propriate materials.
Such knowledge is provided by the Researcher and Prod-
uct & Service Provider, and is then organized and classified
by the Registrar.
3.3.6 Countermeasure Knowledge Base
The Countermeasure Knowledge Base is a knowledge base
that accumulates information on countermeasures to cyber-
security risks, and itself contains two knowledge bases: As-
sessment Knowledge Base and Detection/Protection Knowl-
edge Base.
The Assessment Knowledge Base accumulates known knowl-
edge for security level assessment on IT assets. For instance,
rules and criteria for such assessment and the checklists of
configurations are accumulated. Especially, the best prac-
tices for such information stored here is quite useful from the
viewpoint of reutilzation. The CVSS/CWSS formula [16, 30]
is one of the best practices for assessing security levels and
is accumulated in this knowledge base. The eXtensible Con-
figuration Checklist Description Format (XCCDF) [38] and
Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language (OVAL) [32]
can be utilized to describe the rules and checklists.
The Detection/Protection Knowledge Base accumulates
known knowledge for detecting/protecting security threats.
For instance, rules and criteria for such purpose — such as
intrusion detection system (IDS)/intrusion prevention sys-
tem (IPS) signatures and detection/protection rules that fol-
low the signatures — are accumulated.
Such knowledge is provided by the Researcher and Prod-
uct & Service Provider, and is then organized and classified
by the Registrar.
3.3.7 Product & Service Knowledge Base
The Product & Service Knowledge Base is a knowledge
base that accumulates information on products and services.
It includes two knowledge bases: the Version Knowledge
Base and Configuration Knowledge Base.
The Version Knowledge Base accumulates version infor-
mation on products and services, including naming and enu-
meration of their versions. Regarding the product, security
Table 1: Major cybersecurity information standards
Operation Domain Information categories Major standards
IT Asset
Management
User Resource Database ARF, CRF, CVSS/CWSS scores
Provider Resource Database -
Incident Handling
Incident Database CEE, IODEF
Warning Database -
Knowledge
Accumulation
Cyber Risk
Knowledge Base
Vulnerability Knowledge Base CVE, CWE
Threat Knowledge Base CAPEC, MAEC
Countermeasure
Knowledge Base
Assessment Knowledge Base CVSS/CWSS formula, OVAL, XCCDF
Detection/Protection Knowledge Base -
Product
Knowledge Base
Version Knowledge Base CPE
Configuration Knowledge Base CCE
patches are also included here. Common Platform Enumera-
tion (CPE) [5] can be utilized in order to enumerate common
platforms.
The Configuration Knowledge Base accumulates config-
uration information on products and services. Regarding
product configuration, it includes naming, taxonomy and
enumeration of known configurations. Common Configura-
tion Enumeration (CCE) [27] can be utilized to enumerate
common configurations. Regarding service configuration, it
includes guidelines of service usages.
Such knowledge is provided by the Researcher and Prod-
uct & Service Provider, and is then organized and classified
by the Registrar.
Based on the above discussion, Figure 1 describes the pro-
posed ontology. It depicts cybersecurity operation domains,
entities, cybersecurity operational information and their re-
lationships.
4. DISCUSSION ON CYBERSECURITY IN
CLOUD COMPUTING
The proposed ontology is capable of mapping major cyber-
security information standards as shown in Table 1. Based
on the proposed ontology shown in Figure 1 and correspond-
ing cybersecurity information standards in Table 1, neces-
sary information for cybersecurity in cloud computing and
the need for standard description formats for such informa-
tion are discussed for each of the databases and knowledge
bases in the following subsections.
4.1 User Resource Database
We define user resources as those that users can utilize
regardless of the physical location; be it either in a local IT
asset or in the cloud. Therefore, subscribing cloud services
can also be regarded as user resources. From this viewpoint,
the User Resource Database needs to store two additional
types of information for cloud security: cloud service sub-
scription information and resource dependency information.
Moreover, security level information such as security level
evaluation results should be reviewed to accommodate cloud
computing. The three issues mentioned above are discussed
in the following subsections.
4.1.1 Cloud Service Subscription Information
Major components of Cloud Service Subscription Infor-
mation are the cloud resource list, data access control policy
and identity information.
An Administrator needs to maintain the list of cloud re-
sources to which its organization subscribes, which includes
data, applications, hardware and services. The list is infor-
mation that may be shared with the other internal organi-
zations. For instance, an system administrator from a com-
pany’s headquarters needs to monitor the compliance of its
branches. Or this person needs to deploy the same cloud ser-
vices in each branch to maintain a uniform IT environment
and a uniform security level at each branch. This informa-
tion may also be shared with external organizations. For
instance, some products and/or services may be configured
automatically based on the subscription list so that they
may work effectively and efficiently. As mentioned above,
the list will be shared among different organizations, be it
either internal or external, and it is expected to be auto-
matically handled by machines. Therefore, the description
format of the list needs to be standardized so that it can be
machine-readable.
The data access control policy defines the rights of user
data access, such as those of reading, writing, and executing.
In non-cloud computing, the policy is stored in the local file
system. In cloud computing, it needs to be stored explicitly,
and independently from the data and the file system so it
can be exchanged. For instance, eXtensible Access Control
Markup Language (XACML) [18] can be applied to describe
the policy. In addition to the access control policy for the
data itself, that for the cloud location should also be stored
and implemented.
Another major component for cloud service subscription
information is identity registration. One can have multi-
ple identities in cyber society. A list of user identities and
identity service registration information needs to be stored.
The other service subscription information such as con-
tract information of each subscribing service should also be
stored here.
4.1.2 Resource Dependency Information
Resource dependency information is greatly important in
cloud services from the viewpoint of cybersecurity.
Different from the non-cloud computing, resources impose
very complex dependencies between each other in the cloud
computing since they are multi-layered. In other words,
one resource may be built upon another, which can even
be built upon another. The concept of resource hierarchy
is described in Figure 2, which shows resources built upon
other resources. Albeit only six layers are depicted in Figure
2 for ease of understanding, there may exist more hierar-
chies, which cause more complicated dependencies between
resources in a practical environment. Therefore users may
utilize resource A, which utilizes resource B. In this case,
the users are usually not aware of indirect usage of resource
B. Sometimes resource B can be in the cloud. Under this
multi-layered resource environment, damage of a certain re-
source would affect the other resources directly or indirectly
utilizing it.
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Figure 2: Concept of resource hierarchy
Therefore the Administrator needs to understand how the
damage to one IT resource would affect others. Clear un-
derstanding of resource dependencies facilitates the Admin-
istrator to run cybersecurity operations and maintain avail-
ability of IT functionality. Based on resource dependency in-
formation between two resources, a dependency graph that
describes the chain of resource dependencies can be cre-
ated. This graph helps the Administrator immediately re-
cover from failures and drastically improve availability of IT
functions. Provided that the resource dependencies are un-
clear, and a security flaw is found in one cloud service, the
Administrator in a user organization needs to take signifi-
cant time to identify which IT resources were affected. The
time required to identify the dependency allows the damage
to spread further, and causes unavailability of IT services in
the user organization. With the description of resource de-
pendencies, the administrators may run cybersecurity oper-
ations efficiently and effectively, and service disruption time
is minimized.
Indeed, resource dependency information would provide
a great deal of assistance even for non-cloud applications.
Nowadays, virtualization of software is becoming increas-
ingly common, and the emergence of cloud computing expe-
dites the virtualization trend. In this era, dependency de-
scription is of great assistance to cybersecurity and service
availability.
Until now, cybersecurity operations have emphasized how
to protect systems from external attack. Yet, from here for-
ward, cybersecurity operations need to also consider service
continuity, i.e., service availability. In order to minimize
service disruption at the time of an incident, dependency
information is vital.
If Administrators and/or IT Infrastructure Providers have
a clear understanding of resource dependencies, it is rel-
atively easy to manage availabilities since most resources
are currently managed over virtual systems. Damaged re-
sources can immediately be replaced with undamaged re-
sources, thus users can enjoy the same IT functions/services
without disruption. Once service availability is secured, de-
tailed and sometimes time-agnostic investigation can be con-
ducted for damaged resources. It also expedites automation
of Incident Handling operations. Albeit damage analysis is
rather difficult to automate, the replacement of damaged re-
sources can be done automatically provided the dependency
information is clearly understood by the resource holders.
The need for building a standard format for describing
resource dependency information shall be considered. As
discussed in section 4.4, it is beneficial to have resource de-
pendency information be machine-readable so machines can
automatically process it and identify relevant warning in-
formation for specific users. Beyond that, standardizing in-
formation descriptions may cultivate users and operators,
and let them realize the importance of managing resource
dependency information. Moreover, having built the stan-
dard, the resource dependency information can be shared
with external organizations. For instance, one organization
may send a query to a security operator in order to obtain
effective countermeasures to cyber attacks with resource de-
pendency information. Albeit the effective countermeasures
may differ for each organization, the security operator may
narrow down potentially effective countermeasures based on
the resource dependency information and can provide more
accurate advice to users.
4.1.3 Security Level Information
As with the non-cloud computing environment, security
level evaluation is necessary. Existing information descrip-
tion standards, such as ARF/CRF, can be applied to de-
scribe the evaluation results of the security level under a
cloud computing environment with proper modification. If
necessary, the evaluation results of local resource and the
ones of cloud resource can be separately described on these
formats.
Security level scores, such as CVSS/CWSS scores, can be
applied to a cloud computing environment. However, eval-
uation methodologies, such as the CVSS/CWSS formula,
are subject to change. The methodologies are stored in the
Countermeasure Knowledge Base. Therefore the details of
the methodology changes are discussed in section 4.6.
4.2 Provider Resource Database
The Provider Resource Database needs to be expanded to
accommodate the needs of cloud security. In particular, it
needs to store two types of information — subscriber iden-
tity and service security level — which are discussed in the
following subsections.
4.2.1 Subscriber Identity Information
In order to manage cybersecurity, cloud service providers
need to know subscribers’ identity information. At the min-
imum, they store the list of subscribers and their identities.
Since one user may have multiple identities, the mapping
between users and their identities needs to also be stored.
Cloud service providers store not only identity information
itself but also its associated information, such as the status
of each identity, e.g. valid or invalid, and the reputation of
each identity.
4.2.2 Service Security Level Information
Cloud service providers need to provide security informa-
tion on their services. Two major ways to show their security
levels are by providing a security certificate and a security
level evaluation result; both of which are authorized by third
parties.
A certificate of cloud service security level may certify
whether necessary security control is implemented. Security
control includes implementation of secure technology and
security operation processes. For instance, implementation
of trusted log technologies and a security preservation op-
eration cycle can be certified. Due to the volatile nature of
cybersecurity, these certificates need to be reviewed and re-
newed periodically to maintain their effectiveness. Since this
information will be exchanged among cloud service providers
and users, it is more convenient to have this certificate for-
mat standardized.
Security levels of cloud services may be evaluated, and
the results can be reported. The format of the evaluation
result needs to be standardized so it can be automatically
machine-processed. Since security levels change daily, auto-
matic machine processing is necessary. Albeit the formula
and methodologies of evaluation may differ depending on
the evaluator and depending on the purpose, a common set
of cloud security evaluation methodologies could be devel-
oped, and should be updated periodically; and this common
set may be standardized. For building the standard, met-
rics should be meticulously designed in order to describe the
details of security. They should be reproducible by a third
party.
4.3 Incident Database
Users wish to preserve ownership rights for their data.
In other words, they wish to preserve the confidentiality,
integrity and availability of their own data even if it is in
the cloud. Thus the data must be confidential even to the
cloud service provider where the data is located, must not
be manipulated by anybody else without permission from
the data owners, and once the data is deleted its restoration
must not be possible.
The additional needs incur additional cybersecurity op-
erations. For instance, monitoring of information property
rights violations will be required, and any violation of such
rights should trigger warning of a security incident. Based
on the operation change, two types of information need to
be stored in the database: data provenance [17] and a data
placement change log. The existing scheme to describe in-
cident/event information may also change. These issues are
discussed in the following subsections.
4.3.1 Data Provenance
Data provenance is a document history of electronic data
and records the details of the processes that produced elec-
tronic data back as far as the beginning of time or at least
the epoch of provenance awareness. Therefore, any ma-
nipulation of electronic data, not only its content but also
its metadata such as the access control policy, needs to be
logged. With data provenance, version management/change
tracking of electronic data in the cloud is enabled, and more
importantly, violation of data ownership rights can be mon-
itored. No major standards can be found yet to describe
data provenance. This information should, nevertheless, be
exchanged between cloud service providers, users and inci-
dent response teams. Therefore standardizing the format
would help improve the quality and efficiency of cybersecu-
rity operations.
4.3.2 Data Placement Change Log
Data placement change log is a change log of mapping be-
tween the logical and physical locations of data. One of the
biggest changes from the non-cloud computing to the cloud
computing is the wide implementation of virtualization. A
data center, for instance, implements resource virtualization
technologies and divides its resources so that it can host
more customers. In order to maximize the utilization of its
resources, the physical location of the data may change dy-
namically though its logical location stay the same. In order
to track any incident, the location change, i.e., the change of
mapping between the logical location and physical location,
needs to be logged. Note that the data placement change
log should be recorded not only for the data in the cloud
but also for that in the local IT assets.
This data placement change log can be seen as a part of
data provenance. However, it can also be regarded not as a
manipulation of the data but as a manipulation or swapping
of infrastructure of the data and thus can be regarded as
outside the scope of data provenance. This is a matter of
classification and is outside the scope of this paper.
No major standards can be found yet to describe the data
placement change log. This information should, neverthe-
less, be exchanged between cloud service providers, users
and incident response teams. Therefore standardizing the
format would help improving the quality and efficiency of
cybersecurity operations.
4.3.3 Incident/Event Information
Cybersecurity operations need to record incident/event in-
formation. Standard formats such as CEE and IODEF have
been utilized for this purpose as discussed in section 3.3.1.
In order to accommodate cloud computing, proper modi-
fications and/or extensions for these standard formats are
required to these standard formats.
Existing standards are designed to describe incident in-
formation on assets. Up until now, they have worked well
since assets and data are coupled, and it is very rare for
them to be decoupled. However, in cloud computing, data
and IT assets are often decoupled. Therefore, it is neces-
sary to describe a data incident regardless of the IT asset.
In other words, the target of the incident recording may
differ in cloud computing. Nevertheless, the same informa-
tion format for describing computer events can be utilized.
Therefore, existing standards such as CEE and IODEF can
be adapted to cloud security with proper semantics review.
4.4 Warning Database
Warnings need to be issued to users who possess or uti-
lize at-risk resources. Different from the non-cloud comput-
ing environment, a user may utilize a cloud service, which
may utilize another cloud service that is facing some secu-
rity risks. In other words, a user may indirectly utilize a
resource that has severe security risks. Until now, only the
direct users of a specific at-risk resource stayed aware. Under
the cloud computing environment, indirect users of at-risk
resources should also maintain caution.
One possible scheme to identify indirect users of at-risk
resource is utilizing a resource dependency graph that de-
scribes dependency information between resources, as men-
tioned in section 4.1. By looking up the resource depen-
dency graph, users may recognize whether warning informa-
tion pertains to their own security.
Until now, no major standard format has existed for de-
scribing warnings. However, it may be appropriate to build
a certain standard format for the warnings. In order to
automatically judge whether any certain warning informa-
tion has some affect on user security by accessing the re-
source dependency graph, the warning information needs
to be machine-readable; therefore the format must be stan-
dardized.
On the other hand, as with the information in the Incident
Database discussed in section 4.3, warnings need to pay at-
tention to data incidents that are independent from IT asset
incidents.
4.5 Cyber Risk Knowledge Base
Cyber Risk Knowledge Base accumulates knowledge on
cyber risks. Under a cloud computing environment, the im-
pact range of vulnerability need to be described. Vulnera-
bility caused by mis-configuration will also increase. These
two issues are discussed in the following subsections.
4.5.1 Impact range of vulnerability
Different from a non-cloud computing environment, a user
may utilize a cloud service that may utilize another cloud
service facing some security risks as discussed in section 4.4.
Therefore, vulnerability information needs to be reached by
an indirect user of the resource that exposes the vulnerabil-
ity. Currently, users only keep aware of resources directly
related to their own resources. In order to judge whether
certain vulnerability information affects their security, users
may let the vulnerability information access their resource
dependency graph as mentioned in section 4.1.
Albeit it is advantageous to let machines automatically
judge the relevance of certain vulnerability information, it
is also beneficial to have human-readable information that
describes the vulnerability’s impact range. One way of de-
scribing this impact range is introducing resource layering,
with which each vulnerability specifies its impact range.
Current CVE enumerates vulnerability with no resource-
layering concept. For instance, system and application vul-
nerabilities are enumerated in parallel with no categoriza-
tion. If resource-layering concepts such as the six layers
shown in Figure 2 are introduced, each vulnerability may
identify the layers of the impact range. This information
may increase operators’ knowledge. Therefore, CVE can be
extended to describe each vulnerability’s impact range. At
the same time, the layering concept needs to be shared by
building international standards though it must be meticu-
lously designed.
4.5.2 Configuration vulnerability
In addition to the change of impact range, the contents of
vulnerability information may change in the cloud comput-
ing. Until now, the main focus of vulnerability was the one
found in programming code. However, in the cloud comput-
ing, the importance of vulnerability caused by configuration
will grow. Cloud services are based on a combination of
multiple components. Therefore, configuration to let the ser-
vices work takes on a highly important role. Consequently,
it is expected that a greater number of vulnerabilities caused
by configuration will be found in the cloud computing. Al-
beit current CWE, which is still a work in progress, has
categories for configuration vulnerabilities, these categories
are immature and need further development.
4.6 Countermeasure Knowledge Base
The Countermeasure Knowledge Base accumulates assess-
ment rules, which include scoring methodologies and check-
lists.
Scoring methodologies to evaluate the security level, which
are represented by CVSS, need to be developed further,
as mentioned in section 4.1.3. CVSS provides the scoring
scheme for security levels, based on which Administrators
can prioritize the urgency of security operations on IT as-
sets. Albeit the work of CVSS is innovative, it is still in
its initial stage of development, and its applicability is lim-
ited; it cannot be used for scoring a system that consists of
more than a single PC. Moreover, it is not aware of virtual
machines. Even more, the current formula focuses on the se-
curity level of IT asset, not on data decoupled from IT asset.
Future versions of CVSS need to consider these issues. Al-
beit there exist some activities that tackle the applicability
limitation of the current CVSS, such as Common Assurance
Metric (CAM) introduced by the European Network and
Information Security Agency (ENISA) [1], work is still in
the initial phases. Regarding CWSS, albeit it is still under
development, the same issue mentioned above needs to be
considered in order for it to be applied to cloud security.
A checklist for cloud security, which is best described with
OVAL and XCCDF, also needs to be developed further. Al-
beit both these works are innovative, as with CVSS they
are still in early stages of development and faces the same
limited applicability. Future versions of OVAL and XCCDF
need to consider the same issues mentioned above.
4.7 Product & Service Knowledge Base
In the cloud computing, the Product & Service Knowl-
edge Base needs to contain cloud service enumeration and
its taxonomy. Moreover, configuration information stored in
this knowledge base needs to be developed further. The two
issues are discussed in the following subsections.
4.7.1 Cloud Service Enumeration and Taxonomy
Albeit some standards exist for expressing product infor-
mation, such as CPE, no standards exist for expressing cloud
services. In order to enumerate cloud services, standard
naming rules of cloud service providers and their services
need to be built and commonly shared. Following the in-
crease of the enumeration of cloud services, taxonomy will
need to be built in order to improve usability of knowledge.
This taxonomy needs to be commonly agreed upon, and
shared, thus standardization is preferred. These standards
can be either an extension of existing standards or newly
built standards.
4.7.2 Configuration of services
CCE can still be used to describe the configuration issue
of cloud security. Under a non-cloud computing environ-
ment, the configuration of one product was enumerated and
stored as knowledge. Nevertheless, under a cloud computing
environment, the configuration of multiple resources needs
to be enumerated and stored as knowledge. Cloud services
are based on a combination of multiple resources; therefore
configuration of one service consisting of several resources
is necessary. Configuration and interoperability of multiple
services are also necessary.
5. ESSENTIAL CHANGES IN CLOUD
COMPUTING
Based on the discussion in section 4, this section sum-
marizes the essential changes of cybersecurity information
in cloud computing. Major factors that caused the changes
are three: data-asset decoupling, composition of multiple
resources and external resource usage.
Data-asset decoupling is a characteristics of cloud comput-
ing. Whereas in the non-cloud computing data and assets
were tightly coupled, data and assets can be decoupled and
manipulated independently in the cloud computing. There-
fore, in order to preserve data ownership rights for users,
data provenance and data placement change logs are re-
quired.
Composition of multiple resources is another characteris-
tic of cloud computing, wherein multiple resources comprise
one service, and users may indirectly use various resources.
This characteristic is advanced and expedited by resource
virtualization technologies. That requires three types of in-
formation: resource dependency information, security as-
sessment methodologies, and configuration information of
multiple resources. Resource dependency information is re-
quired to identify who is affected by certain cybersecurity
risks and to whom certain cybersecurity information such
as warnings and vulnerability needs to be delivered. Secu-
rity assessment methodologies in cloud computing is, differ-
ent from those in non-cloud computing, required to be able
to assess security levels of multiple resources as one service.
Configuration information of multiple resources is required
to let one service consisting of multiple resources, and let
multiple services, work effectively and efficiently.
External resource usage is a further characteristic of cloud
computing, wherein external resources are, from a user view-
point, utilized as internal resources. Therefore, enumeration
of services and its taxonomy, the list of cloud services a user
subscribes to, security level assessment information of cloud
services, and identities of users need to be provided.
Meanwhile, we found that the paradigm of security is
shifting. Until now, the major focus of security was on how
to protect systems from information security risks. Never-
theless, how to maintain IT service functionality without
service disruptions, i.e., availability, is becoming a primary
aspect of security. Cloud computing enables maintaining
of availability since a service consists of multiple resources,
each of which can be replaced dynamically at the time of
service failure. In order to maintain availability, aforemen-
tioned information such as resource dependency needs to be
stored and utilized.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed an ontological approach toward cy-
bersecurity in cloud computing. We built an ontology for
cybersecurity operational information based on actual cy-
bersecurity operations mainly focused on non-cloud comput-
ing. In order to discuss necessary cybersecurity information
in cloud computing, we applied the ontology to cloud com-
puting.
Through the discussion, we identified three major factors
that affect cybersecurity information in cloud computing:
data-asset decoupling, composition of multiple resources and
external resource usage. Based on the changes in cloud com-
puting, we identified the cybersecurity information necessi-
tated by essential changes such as data provenance and re-
source dependency information. Moreover, we found that
the paradigm of security is now shifting and availability is
becoming one of the most important aspects.
By implementing cybersecurity information identified in
this paper, quality cybersecurity operations in cloud com-
puting will be achieved, and cybersecurity in cloud comput-
ing will be significantly improved.
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